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A Plan for Compensating Student-Athletes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intercollegiate athletics have been a part of the university 
system for many years. Successful athletic programs are a way 
of instilling pride in the student body, and bringing prestige, 
name recognition, and funding to the university. An unfortu-
nate by-product of college athletics has been the exploitation of 
student-athletes. This paper will discuss some ways in which 
student-athletes have been exploited and why reforms are 
needed in college athletics. We will discuss some of the meth-
ods the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association) has 
employed in an attempt to cure this exploitation and explain 
why further steps need to be taken. Since professional and 
college sports are inevitably intertwined, we advocate that pro-
fessional sports leagues assist in protecting student-athletes. 
This paper introduces a plan that would allow monetary com-
pensation for student-athletes. This plan will fairly compensate 
student-athletes for their work while preserving the amateur 
nature of college athletics. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As college athletics have become more lucrative, their sig-
nificance often overshadows the institution's academic purpos-
es. Indeed, college athletics have become big business. In 1989, 
the NCAA signed a seven-year, one billion dollar television 
contract giving CBS the exclusive right to televise all NCAA 
basketball tournament games. 1 The NCAA has a multimillion-
dollar annual budget and it negotiates and administers for 
itself or its members for regular season sports over $20,000,000 
a year in television contracts.2 For this reason, Hunter R. 
Rawlings III, president of the University of Iowa, has suggested 
that television controls university athletics.3 "TV determines 
1. CBS Lands Sole Rights to NCAA, BINGHAMTON PRESS AND SUN BULL., 
Nov. 22 1989, at Cl. 
2. William B. Briggs & Deborah E. Klein, Proposition 48 and the Business of 
Intercollegiate Athletics: Potential Antitrust Ramifications Under the Sherman Act, 
67 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 309 (1990). 
3. Hunter R. Rawlings III, Why Did We Take So Long?, SPORTS ILLUSTRAT-
ED, Jan. 21 1991, at 72. 
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the times and sites of our games, controls our athletic 
departments' budgets, and dictates conference membership and 
realignments."4 Many teams also bring in money through local 
television coverage. Ticket sales to sell-out stadium events 
produce additional revenue. 
In addition to direct revenue, successful college athletic 
programs use their name recognition to market merchandise 
adorned with their school names and logos throughout the 
country. They further generate substantial revenue by convert-
ing their athletic programs' prestige and notoriety into gener-
ous alumni donations and increased enrollment.5 At the center 
of all this money are the student-athletes who are prohibited 
from sharing in the revenue that they generate. Exploitation 
results from universities' focus on potential revenue that ath-
letes might bring to the school, rather than the student's per-
sonal and educational welfare. 
Ill. NCAA EXPLOITATION OF ATHLETES 
The ideal university is a composite institution which is 
primarily an intellectual agency. It has been argued that the 
role of student athletes is inconsistent with this ideal.6 In most 
cases, the underlying purpose of a college education is to pre-
pare students for their chosen careers. However, students who 
have chosen a career in athletics will find many restrictive 
barriers placed in their paths. These barriers make it difficult 
for student-athletes to achieve career goals. Even though uni-
versities do not offer degrees in football or basketball, they 
recruit people specifically for these programs. One purpose for 
recruiting these athletes is to enhance the university's athletic 
programs, thereby increasing profits. 7 "Hundreds of thousands 
of dollars are generated for the benefit of the university that 
can field a team of talented 'amateurs,' but the players them-
selves sacrifice everything, including education and physical 
abilities for a chance to play with the pros."8 The intellectual 
4. ld. 
5. Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to 
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206 (1990). See also Jensen, Taxation, the Student 
Athlete, and the Pro{essionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH LAW REV. 35, 
44 & n.39 (1987). 
6. Robert N. Davis, Academics and Athletics on a Collision Course, 66 N.D. 
L. REV. 239 (1990). 
7. ld. 
8. ld. at 252. 
1 
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life for which the university is assumed to exist has been over-
shadowed by the business, industry, journalism and salesman-
ship of organized athletics on an extensive commercial basis by 
the university and the NCAA, the predominant governing body 
over major college athletics.9 
Article 2.6 of the NCAA's Constitution provides, "(s1tudent-
athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport and their 
I~articipation should be motivated primarily by education and 
not by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. 
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avoca-
tion, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation 
by professional and commercial enterprises.'no 
However laudable these goals, this definition assumes that 
NCAA institutions themselves are not commercial enterprises 
and would not exploit student-athletes. This is a natural, yet 
incorrect assumption most likely perpetuated by the simple fact 
that students who take part in athletics are not permitted to 
receive direct monetary compensation for their participation. 
Despite the NCAA's stated purpose, the main goal of many 
university athletic programs is to generate money ... big mon-
ey. The money generated and the manner in which it is admin-
istered, would likely qualify the NCAA itself as one of the com-
mercial enterprises warned of in the NCAA Constitution. 11 It 
has been argued that the NCAA violates the Sherman Anti-
trust Act/2 due process/3 a student-athlete's right to con-
tract, 14 and its own constitutional provision against commercial 
enterprises. 
Another of the stated purposes of the NCAA is to preserve 
the amateur nature of college athletics. 15 This supposedly pro-
tects the image and unique nature of college athletics. 16 Howev-
er, this is not the only effect of these amateurism rules. Be-
cause of the large amounts of money generated by college ath-
letics, the NCAA, as well as individual universities, utilize 
9. ld. at 239. 
10. NCAA CONST. art. 2.6, National Collegiate Athletic Association Manual 
1990-91, at 4 (emphasis added). 
11. ld. 
12. Briggs & Klien, Supra note 2. 
13. Robin J. Green, Note, Does the NCAA Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis 
of NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42 DUKE L. J. 99 (1922). 
14. Derek Q. Johnson, Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Ap-
plication of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 96 (1985). 
15. ld. at 307. 
16. ld. 
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many of these amateurism rules to protect their profits rather 
than their athletes. Amateurism rules that purport to protect 
the student-athlete are actually used to protect a university's 
investment in the athlete. These rules are an attempt to keep 
the student-athlete eligible and generating money for as long 
as possible. 
Scholarships are not altruistic and benevolent gifts of mon-
ey to athletes. If an athlete fails to perform and play up to 
expectations, the scholarship is lost. This is not due to academ-
ic failure but because potential earnings for the school have 
faltered. 
Money from college athletics is generated predominantly 
through the labor and efforts (and at the expense of) the col-
lege athlete. "The expected and actual market consequences of 
the NCAA's Rules are a reduction in the wages of student-ath-
letes, greater profits for colleges, [and] a transfer of income 
from low-income athletes to higher income coaches .... "17 
Without adequate compensation of student-athletes, the NCAA 
and individual universities actively exploit their athletes. This 
is done first, through their failure to educate athletes, 18 and 
second, by the failure to adequately compensate them for their 
services. Looking at college athletics in this light, the NCAA 
Constitution is extremely hypocritical. 
IV. AN NCAA ATTEMPT TO ERADICATE STUDENT-ATHLETE 
EXPLOITATION 
A. Excluding Academically Incapable Athletes 
Student-athletes are exploited when schools admit athletes 
who clearly cannot meet the university's minimum academic 
demands. In an attempt to eliminate this exploitation, the 
NCAA passed Proposition 48. As initially passed, Proposition 
48 required incoming freshman student-athletes to have at 
least a 2.0 high school grade point average, and a score of at 
least 700 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test in order to be eligible 
for competition in intercollegiate sports during their freshman 
17. Goldman, Supra note 5. 
18. See Knight Foundation, Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, Keeping 
Faith With the Student Athlete, 16 (199l)(indicating that only between 33% and 
37.5% of the athletes in a Division I basketball or football program ultimately 
graduate). 
I 
l 
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year. 19 This rule was ratified amid great debate at the 1993 
NCAA Convention. 
Some argued that the SAT exam was racially discriminato-
ry against black athletes.20 Others argued that students were 
exploited for their athletic skills. Before the passage of Proposi-
tion 48, many argued that student-athletes were exploited by 
being admitted into college with no real prospect of classroom 
success or obtaining a college degree.21 The single purpose of 
their admittance was to bolster the college's athletic program, 
thereby bringing more revenue to the school. Without even an 
education to redress the student-athletes, they went largely un-
compensated. 
Mter years of capitalizing on student-athletes in this man-
ner, the conference delegates (university presidents and chan-
cellors) resolved to protect student-athletes from exploita-
tion.22 However, only the Division I schools promulgated Propo-
sition 48 as a "Bylaw."23 This indicates the lack of concern 
19. See NCAA, Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association, 119 (1983) [hereinafter NCAA Proceedings (1983)]. As 
amended in the 1992 NCAA convention, Proposition 48 now requires a minimum 
high school G.P.A. of 2.5, and a sliding test score index allowing those who score 
higher than 700 on the SAT to be eligible with a G.P.A. lower than 2.5. 
William F. Reed, The NCAA Gets Even Tougher on Athletes' Academics, SPORTS 
!LLU&'TRATED Jan. 20, 1992, at 7. 
20. ld. The discrimination argument is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
purpose of discussing Proposition 48 here is to demonstrate an attempt by the 
NCAA to alleviate some of the exploitation of student-athletes. 
21. Kevin M. McKenna, A Proposition With a Powerful Punch: The Legality 
and Constitutionality of NCAA Proposition 48, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 43 (1987). 
22. ld. Dr. Harry Edwards, a Sociology of Sports professor at The University 
of California at Berkeley, stated that "[t]here are thousands of athletes being 
passed through college without regard for academic progress. That is exploitation, 
not assistance." ld. at 44, n.6. 
23. See NCAA Proceedings (1983), Supra note 19, at 124. The Bylaw pro-
vides: 
Effective August 1, 1986, in order to be eligible for practice, participation in 
regular-season competition and athletically related fmancial aid during the first 
academic year in residence, a student entering a Division I NCAA member institu-
tion directly out of high school must have: 
(i) Graduated from high school with a minimum grade-point average of 
2.000 (based on a maximum of 4.000) in a core curriculum of at least 11 academic 
full-year courses, including at least three in English, two in mathematics, two in 
social science and two in natural or physical science (including at least one labora-
tory class, if offered by the high school) as well as a 700 combined score on the 
SAT verbal and math sections or a 15 composite score on the ACT, or; 
(ii) Presented more than the minimum standard set forth in the preceding 
paragraph for either the core-curriculum grade-point average or required test score, 
in which case eligibility may be established during the specified time periods on 
the basis of the following eligibility indices: 
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with exploitation at Division II and III level schools. Grambling 
State University's Joseph B. Johnson asked the unanswered 
question: ''Why are we not setting standards for all of the 
NCAA instead of just Division I?"24 The obvious answer is 
that these schools do not generate as much money as Division I 
schools, therefore, exploitation is less likely. The money made 
in Division I schools is the major difference separating them 
from Division II and III schools. This is further evidence that 
the NCAA recognizes that money is the driving force behind ex-
ploitation of student-athletes. 
Despite the general sentiment that "this legislation is not 
only appropriate but indeed is necessary to preserve the organi-
zational integrity of the NCAA as well as the institutional 
integrity of our member institutions,"25 the convention fell 
short of its goal to end exploitation. Many current NCAA re-
strictions aid or allow exploitation of student-athletes. The 
executive Director of the NCAA, Richard Schultz has stated, 
"[I]t is time for us to take stock of what we have created, save 
the positives but immediately rid ourselves of the negatives 
and develop a new, innovative approach for athletics that plac-
es it in perspective and allows athletics to be a vital, honorable 
part of higher education."26 Proposition 48 was a helpful, 
though inadequate, attempt to carry out the desires of Director 
Schultz. 
B. Protection of Student-Athletes Admitted to College 
Proposition 48 prevents exploitation of those athletes who 
cannot meet entrance requirements. It does not, however, pro-
tect student-athletes who are ultimately admitted to college. 
They are exploited in many ways. For example, college sports 
programs: 
For those freshmen entering subsequent to August 1, 1986 and prior to August 
1, 1987: 
GPA SAT ACT 
2.2000-above 600 13 
2.100-2.199 680 14 
2.000-2.099 700 15 
1.990-1.999 720 16 
1.800-1.899 740 17 
See, NCAA Guide for the College-Bound Student Athlete, at 14 (Feb. 1986). 
24. See NCAA Proceedings 1983, at 103 supra note 19. 
25. ld. 
26. Richard Shultz, address to 84th NCAA Convention, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 
10, 1990, at 3. 
1 
' 
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often control the daily lives of scholarship athletes. The [pro-
grams] schedule mandatory practices, weight training ses-
sions, and team meetings. These constraints, as well as the 
intrusions on class and study time from road trips, seriously 
impair the student-athlete's opportunity to acquire a mean-
ingful education.'127 
Proposition 48 does not provide for remuneration of ath-
letes, nor does it give them quality education and career prepa-
ration. In other words, Proposition 48 merely reduces the pool 
of athletes available for NCAA exploitation. It also partially 
eliminates one of the methods of exploitation-the selection of 
potential student-athletes based solely on athletic merit. 
Proposition 48 sends a clear message to high school stu-
dent-athletes: They must prepare themselves academically as 
well as athletically for college. This is a valuable aspect of the 
proposition, and for this reason it should not be abolished. 
However, something should be done to impress on college ath-
letes that academic progress is as important as athletics. Prop-
osition 48 is a good rule, but it is not enough to reduce the 
exploitation of student-athletes once they are admitted to col-
lege. 
V. F AlLURE TO COMPENSATE 
A. Scholarship-Compensation Theory 
Universities claim that providing athletes with a scholar-
ship and paying for their education is sufficient compensation. 
Granted, athletes are benefitted by scholarships; these benefits 
may even be considered monetary in nature. However, athletes 
are in a situation unique to that of other non-athlete students 
due to the large amounts of money they generate for the school. 
Non-athlete students can also receive scholarships for their 
special talents, even if these talents are not used to generate 
money. A prime example of this inequity is the NCAA limited 
compensation rule.28 This rule prohibits student-athletes from 
27. Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Edu-
cational Obligation to Student-athletes, 28 Hous. L. REV. 743, 788 (1991) (citations 
omitted). 
28. NCAA bylaw 12.1.1 provides that: 
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate 
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or her athletics 
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a prom-
ise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate 
-----------------"""···~,-
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using the skills developed in their sport to generate money for 
themselves.29 An athlete cannot receive any money in the form 
of salaries, gratuities, bonuses, game receipts, payments for 
unspecified expenses beyond actual and necessary travel, room 
and meal expenses, or any other preferential treatment or 
benefits based on athletic skills or reputation.30 These rules 
allow the NCAA and the universities to corner the market on 
young athletes. Non-athlete students are not placed under the 
same confining restrictions as their athlete counterparts. For 
example, if a student majoring in English literature were to 
write a best selling novel, there would be no restriction on 
receiving the profits from the sale of the novel simply because 
English was the intended major. The same would be true of an 
Engineering student who develops and patents a product while 
in school. These students would receive their profits from mar-
keting their skills. Why should athletes be held to a different 
standard? The answer is found in the almighty dollar generat-
ed by student-athletes for the school. According to the "scholar-
ship as compensation" theory, as applied to athletes, an Eng-
lish or Engineering student should be precluded from collecting 
the profits from their products if they are on scholarship. 
Another flaw to this theory is its failure to take into ac-
count student-athletes who are not on scholarship, the "walk-
on" athletes. If scholarships are compensation for the time and 
effort of athletes, then walk-on athletes are completely uncom-
pensated. Accordingly, they should be allowed to profit from 
their athletic talents. Undoubtedly, if non-scholarship athletes 
were allowed this opportunity, the more prominent and talent-
ed athletes as well would gladly give up their scholarships in 
exchange for the same opportunity, which could potentially 
earn them substantial economic benefit from endorsements or 
salaries for off-season play. Furthermore, this theory presup-
poses that none of these athletes are on academic scholarship. 
If they are on academic as opposed to athletic scholarships, 
under this theory they should be given exemption from NCAA rules. 
athletics participation; . . . (d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimburse-
ment of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional 
sports organization based upon athletics skill or participation, except as permitted 
by NCAA rules and regulations; . . . . 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter 
NCAA MANUAL). 
29. Id. 
30. NCAA MANUAL supra note 28, Bylaw 12.1.2, at 58-59. ' I 
I 
l 
r 
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Compensation through scholarships is also inequitable 
among athletes. It is not an accurate reflection of the worth of 
a stand-out athlete. An exceptionally talented athlete will be 
more responsible for the sell-out crowds and the media revenue 
brought to the school than the player who only sees limited 
playing time. Despite the difference in revenue generated, both 
athletes are compensated the same. Some have argued that 
this is not an inequity since both athletes are required to put 
in the same amount of time for their sport. However, this argu-
ment would be considered ridiculous if applied to the business 
world. Nobody expects a janitor at a multi-million dollar com-
pany to be paid the same as the company's CEO simply be-
cause they work the same number of hours. There is no reason 
to apply this faulty rationale to student-athletes. 
B. Shortcomings of the Scholarship-Compensation Theory 
While athletic scholarships cover a majority of the costs of 
attending college, other expenses are not covered. Jim 
Herrmann,31 a member of the Brigham Young University foot-
ball team, related the difficulties of earning extra money for 
things not covered by any athletic scholarship. He noted that 
because of the time constraints involved with participation in 
football and keeping up with classes, it was impossible to take 
on a job to earn extra spending money. Because of this, it was 
very difficult for some players to do simple things like go to a 
movie or out for pizza. 32 
Travis Bice,33 an ex-member of the UNLV basketball team, 
added that many of the players who come from economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds can not afford a plane ticket to 
return home for the holidays. NCAA rules even prohibit any 
financial assistance for situations as those described by Mr. 
Herrmann and Mr. Bice. 34 It is doubtful that any sanctions 
would be brought against a non-athlete who accepted a plane 
31. Interview with Jim Herrmann, former defensive lineman for the B.Y.U. 
football team during their national championship year in 1984, and then for the 
Dallas Cowboys and the Cincinnati Bengals in the NFL (Feb. 16, 1993). Mr. 
Herrmann is currently working on his Juris Doctorate degree at BYU. 
32. !d. 
33. Interview with Travis Bice, former player for the University of Las Vegas 
basketball team from 1988 to 1991 and member of their 1990 national champion-
ship team (Feb. 21, 1993). Mr. Bice is currently working on his Masters of Busi-
ness Administration at UNLV. 
34. See NCAA Proceedings, supra, note 24 and accompanying text. 
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ticket home from the university. It seems ironic that athletes 
who are responsible for generating so much money cannot even 
partake of some of these simple pleasures. 
A sad example of this type of exploitation occurred in the 
1992 college basketball Final Four Tournament. The Final 
Four is used as a selling vehicle for college basketball. The 
NCAA throws lavish parties for sponsors, coaches, reporters, 
and various school officials. The tournament is also a great 
source of revenue for the host city. The root of all this money, 
the players, are often overlooked, and in 1992, two members of 
the Cincinnati basketball team did not even have a single fami-
ly member in attendance at the game.35 So many people mak-
ing so much money, while those most responsible for the large 
income stream cannot even afford plane tickets for their fami-
lies. 
It is true that a student athlete who does not want to be 
exploited can walk away from the program. However, where 
does this leave the athlete with the desire and potential talent 
to play professional sports? College athletic programs are used 
by professional sports as a minor league proving grounds. The 
chances of athletes reaching the professional level are virtually 
non-existent without the proper forum to display their talents. 
C. Unworthy Athletes Take Seats of Worthy Students 
Because the primary goal of colleges should be to provide 
higher education, an argument has been advanced that aca-
demically unworthy student-athletes take up seats in colleges 
that should go to other academically oriented students. One 
writer has stated, "[f]or every point guard in the NBA, I'll bet 
there were 10 potential doctors who never got further than the 
street corner."36 This is a misconception about college athlet-
ics. In reality, the revenues generated by the sports program 
directly and indirectly help to expand universities and provide 
educational opportunities for more people. 
A good example can be found at BYU, where the athletic 
department, because of their success, was able to make a gen-
erous donation toward the costs of expanding the BYU law 
library. Successful sports programs also bring notoriety and 
35. Phil Taylor, Players Have Rights Too, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 23, 1992, 
at 124. 
36. Tony Kornheiser, Drawing the line at U-Md., THE WASHINGTON PoST, 
May 2, 1991 Final ed., at B-1. 
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prestige to a school. This, in turn, translates to higher enroll-
ment that increases school revenue. The increased revenue can 
then be used for expansion, making more seats available for 
potential doctors to leave the street corner and enter the class-
room. Therefore, the money generated by the premiere ath-
letes in college athletics is actually benefitting academically 
oriented students; meanwhile, the athletes themselves are not 
benefitted to the extent of their contribution. 
VI. A PLAN FOR COMPENSATING STUDENT ATHLETES 
Because student-athlete generate substantial revenue, they 
should receive some form of compensation. Both Mr. Bice and 
Mr. Herrmann agreed with this view, however, both were con-
cerned with how this would be done. We believe that it is im-
portant to preserve the amateur qualities of college athletics. 
We also believe that college athletics should not be detached 
from the universities. 
The relationship between college athletics and professional 
sports leagues has been beneficial to both and we believe this is 
why the separate organizations should work more closely to-
gether. The colleges receive greater attention because they 
provide a good showcase of the future talent to be seen in the 
professional leagues. The professional leagues benefit from a 
testing grounds to assist them in their competitive selection of 
talent. 
A. Education of the Student-Athlete 
Simply admitting athletes into college does not guarantee 
that they will receive an education. 37 The demands of "big 
time" college athletics detours student-athletes away from 
giving proper attention to their academic responsibilities. Col-
lege athletic programs insist on winning teams, which require 
practicing upwards of 30 hours a week, season competition 
lasting five months, extensive travel, and also adequate school 
grades. 
Our proposed plan would allow student-athletes to receive 
compensation for their athletic talents. While this would not 
eliminate all of the obstacles that college athletics places before 
student-athletes trying to receive an education, it would be 
helpful in solving some of the problems. A possible positive 
37. See Briggs & Klien, supra, note 2. 
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effect of paying student-athletes could be that more athletes 
would stay in school to finish their degree programs. Financial 
pressures would be alleviated and the lure of the big money of 
professional sports might be less tempting to student-athletes. 
1. Assistance from professional leagues 
College and professional sports act together in many ways. 
As stated above, colleges serve as a minor league for profes-
sional sports, especially basketball and football. The NBA and 
NFL benefit from receiving quality athletes. Because of their 
close ties, and the powerful influence of the professional 
leagues, the NCAA should work in conjunction with profession-
al sports to help encourage student-athletes to get their degree 
before leaving college. 
A recent concern in professional sports is the escalating 
contracts demanded by athletes. The rookie that holds out for 
more money has become commonplace in professional sports. 
For example, the 1993 basketball season began with two first 
round draft picks, Alonzo Mourning of Georgetown and Jimmy 
Jackson of Ohio State University, sitting out the beginning of 
the season in a battle for more money. Problems of this sort 
have caused concern among the NBA owners. One of the sug-
gested solutions to this problem is to impose a salary cap on all 
rookies that enter the league. This idea could be expanded to 
give incentives to college athletes to stay in school and receive 
a college degree. 
At the last few NBA All-Star games, the NBA has put on a 
"Stay in School Jam" to encourage younger students to get a 
good education. In contrast, the big money of professional bas-
ketball lures the college student away from education. Working 
together, and using the salary cap concept, the NBA and NCAA 
can encourage student-athletes to finish their education. 
2. The Salary Cap Schedule 
The Salary Cap plan involves a series of caps placed on 
rookies entering the NBA. 38 The further athletes progress in 
their college education, the higher the cap. The lowest level 
salary cap would be applied to athletes who leave college before 
38. For easier treatment with this part of our plan, we will deal with the 
NBA as an example. However, this can be applied to all sports that recruit from 
colleges. 
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their senior year. Salary for these athletes could be limited to 
$500,000 for the first year, and $700,000 the second, for exam-
ple. 
Another cap would be set for those athletes that complete 
four years of college, but do not receive their degree. This cap 
could be set at $750,000 for the first year, and one million 
dollars the second. This cap would encourage students to com-
plete their four years of college. 
The final cap would be applied to those student-athletes 
that not only complete their four years of college, but also re-
ceive their degrees. We would limit these students to a one 
year cap of 1.5 million dollars. This would be a significant in-
centive for student-athletes to complete their college educa-
tions. Just as Proposition 48 sent a message to high school 
students to take their education seriously, the salary cap sched-
ule would encourage college athletes to work hard toward ob-
taining their degrees. This would be of great use to those who 
make it into the NBA as well as those who do not. 
This schedule would be beneficial to the NBA by helping to 
curb the excessive salaries paid to rookies and set a new base 
for starting salaries to work from. The colleges will be benefit-
ted by retaining money generating athletes, who would be 
encouraged to stay in school longer. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, student-athletes are benefitted if they decide to com-
plete their education and receive their degree. 
Because of the way the present system works, this plan 
will likely meet resistance from college athletes, especially 
those with a promising outlook to play at the professional level. 
Student-athletes today are accustomed to the big money offered 
for entering professional sports. They are not likely to willingly 
accept such limitations. However, this plan still allows student-
athletes to negotiate lucrative deals after their second year. 
The plan might also be more easily accepted by student-
athletes if implemented in combination with our plan to com-
pensate them while in college. The money they receive in col-
lege would help facilitate their education. A salary cap on rook-
ies is already something being considered by the NBA. The 
NBA has the power and the influence on the student-athlete to 
make this plan work. This plan would also help eliminate some 
of the salary problems that the NBA is experiencing. 
A possible downfall of the plan is the potential loss of play-
ers to other leagues such as the European leagues. A salary cap 
should be imposed on these players if they return to play in the 
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NBA. We do not think that most athletes would try to skirt the 
salary cap by playing in Europe, if they knew if meant sacrific-
ing the prestige and earning potential associated with playing 
in the NBA and the imposition of a salary cap upon their at-
tempted transfer from the European leagues to the NBA. 
It is important to encourage athlete's to complete their 
education. This plan accomplishes that goal with an endorse-
ment of the NBA. The salary cap will encourage more students 
to finish their education and receive their degrees. This will 
then alleviate some of the exploitation of student-athletes be-
cause a college education can be viewed as partial compensa-
tion. The salary cap amounts may be varied, but the structure 
should be maintained. 
B. No Direct Payment From Universities 
In preserving the amateur nature of college athletics, our 
plan would not allow payment of athletes to come directly from 
university sources. If direct compensation of student-athletes 
were allowed, student-athletes' choice of which university to 
attend would be determined mostly, if not completely, by who 
could offer them the most money. This would create an imbal-
ance in college athletics. The schools with the most money 
would be able to buy up all the talent. Factors currently used 
in deciding which school to attend would become far less impor-
tant. These factors which maintain a balance of power between 
the universities include: quality of education, personal attach-
ments, state or school pride, family tradition and background. 
Furthermore, allowing schools to pay athletes would cause an 
even greater emphasis on sports over education. 
Another problem would be determining the relative value 
of the athletes. If contract prices were to escalate as they have 
at the professional level, it would cause financial devastation at 
most universities. Higher tuition would probably be charged in 
order to pay for these salaries. This would place an unfair 
burden on the non-athlete students. The athletic programs of 
many schools are not profitable. Our goal is to eliminate exploi-
tation of the student-athlete, while increasing the profit poten-
tial of the university. We feel that under our plan these impor-
tant factors could be preserved. 
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C. Allow Endorsements 
Currently, student-athletes are not allowed to receive en-
dorsements under the NCAA rules.39 This funnels endorsement 
money to the coaches and away from the athletes who more 
directly generate interest in the products. By allowing endorse-
ments, the free market system will be allowed to determine the 
worth of the athletes. The better players will receive greater 
endorsements than the less "famous" players. This is more 
equitable to all concerned. The athletes who generate the mon-
ey could receive it and be benefitted for their abilities and tal-
ents in an equitable way. The more prominent athletes will 
receive the larger national endorsements, while the less promi-
nent athletes will probably receive smaller endorsement offers 
from local businesses. 
As the situation now stands, all the endorsement money 
goes to the coaches. We believe that there is no valid reason for 
the coaches to reap such a windfall from the notoriety of his 
players. College basketball and football coaches at major insti-
tutions frequently earn salaries that are several times greater 
than salaries paid to university presidents.40 This is usually 
because of the endorsement money a coach receives. Allowing 
student-athletes to receive endorsements would balance, to a 
small extent, the coaches' earnings with the earnings of the 
university presidents, as well as the athletes. Presently, compa-
nies are paying coaches large sums of money to encourage 
them to have their players use the companies' products. The 
athlete, not the coach, is the one producing the endorsements 
and should be the one receiving the payments. 
By allowing endorsements, universities need not contribute 
any money. All of the money comes from outside companies 
that wish to promote their products. The student-athletes bene-
fit according to their talent while the schools are not harmed, 
nor burdened with extra administrative expenses. The athletes 
would negotiate separately with companies that want the ath-
letes to endorse their products. An added benefit to athletes are 
the "real world" experiences they will receive in negotiating 
and dealing with endorsement companies. 
39. See, NCAA Proceedings 1983, supra, notes 24 and 25 and accompanying 
text. 
40. Ethan Lock, Unreasonable NCAA Eligibility Rules Send Braxton Banks 
Truckin, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 645-6 (1991). 
---
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Another benefit of this plan could be the reduction of "un-
der the table," and dishonest deals that the NCAA is currently 
being plagued with.41 For the past several years, there have 
been many major scandals that have cost universities millions 
of dollars. For example, the University of Maryland's (UM) 
coaches were accused of giving cash payments to athletes and 
providing improper transportation.42 UM was subsequently 
banned from post-season tournament competition for two years, 
which cost the school approximately $3.8 million in revenue.43 
If student-athletes could receive endorsement money, they 
would be less likely to accept payments considered illegal un-
der NCAA rules from recruiters, alumni or coaches. This would 
reduce the number of NCAA sanctions which cost universities 
millions of dollars. Granted, allowing endorsements is not the 
complete answer to the "corruption" problem but it would be a 
movement away from the status quo and in the right direction. 
D. Allow Athletes to Retain Agents 
If athletes are allowed to seek endorsements, it will be 
necessary to allow them to retain agents. It is difficult to un-
derstand the rationale behind the prohibition of agents. Agents 
will be very helpful in assisting athletes with the complexities 
of dealing with endorsement contracts. Travis Bice stated that 
the "no agent" rule was ridiculous even absent the need for 
assistance with endorsements. He stated that student-athletes 
need an agent just to understand the NCAA rules. Travis cited 
the case of a teammate at UNLV, Anderson Hunt, who de-
clared himself eligible for the draft in hopes that he would be 
recruited after his junior year. When he was not drafted, he 
lost his senior year of eligibility. Travis felt that if Hunt would 
have been allowed to consult an agent, his decision would have 
been better informed and he might not have lost his senior 
year of eligibility. Pressures and intricacies of dealing with 
attorneys and businessmen pursuant to endorsement contracts 
will make it essential to allow student-athletes to consult with 
an agent. 
41. See Davis, Supra note 6 at 240. 
42. !d. at 239. 
43. !d. 
I 
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E. Allow Pay for Playing in Off Season 
Another amateurism rule restricts student-athletes from 
receiving payment for off-season play.44 Similar to allowing 
endorsements, allowing student-athletes to receive off-season 
pay would not cost schools any revenue. All levels of athletes, 
stars and non-stars, should be allowed to receive some compen-
sation for their talent. It seems inequitable that other students 
are allowed to use their talents when the athlete is not. Music 
majors, business majors, drama majors, law students, etc., are 
all allowed to use their talents to help pay for their education. 
In a study sponsored by the NCAA, football and basketball 
players reported having less money available after expenses 
than non-athlete students.45 Almost fifty-eight percent said 
the money they have is inadequate.46 
Athletes have developed their talents and earned their 
reputations through their own efforts. They should be allowed 
to capitalize on those efforts. Some claim that it is the school 
that gives the athlete a forum to display his talents, that with-
out the school he would be nothing. This recognition is argued 
to be adequate compensation. This is clearly a two way street. 
Without these athletes, athletic programs would not be finan-
cially successful. It is hypocritical for the NCAA to restrict off 
season pay for student-athletes when its member universities 
continue to seek new ways of increasing revenues at the ex-
pense of the athlete. There is no need to place restrictions on 
athletes' use of their talents that are not placed on non-ath-
letes. 
Off-season pay would be a partial payment for their hard 
work and efforts. The time has come to eliminate the inequities 
placed on student-athletes that are not placed on other stu-
dents. To say that the athletes are not receiving fair treatment 
is an understatement. 
F. Sharing Tournament and Bowl Game Awards 
with Athletes 
The biggest money generated by college athletics comes 
from championship tournaments and football's annual bowl 
44. See NCAA Proceedings, supra, notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text. 
45. Center for the Study of Athletics, Summary Results from the 1987-88 
National Study of Intercollegiate Athletes: Report No. 1 at 32-33 (Nov. 1988). 
46. ld. 
, .. ....,, 
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games. The teams that make it to these special post season 
games are paid well. In the case of football, the higher ranked 
schools are often involved in a bidding war by the more promi-
nent and wealthy bowl game organizers and sponsors. Some of 
this money should go to the athletes who earned the rights to 
play in these post-season games. The money need not go to the 
athletes as cash payments, but could go to them indirectly. 
A program could be set up so that some of the money could 
be used to pay the expenses of two people of each athlete's 
choice to attend the games. This would avoid the situation that 
occurred with the Cincinnati players in the 1992 Final Four 
basketball tournament. Care should be taken to avoid abuses of 
these awards such as scalping. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Student-athletes are exploited not only through 
universities' failure to educate them, but also through the ama-
teurism rules that deny them compensation for their talents 
and services. Proposition 48 was an attempt by the NCAA to 
deal with a small part of the exploitation problem, and was a 
step in the right direction. However, this rule does not compen-
sate student-athletes, but only protects them from one form of 
exploitation. Student-athletes who commit to a sport and spend 
most of their time practicing, traveling and playing the game 
should be compensated for their efforts and talents as well as 
protected from other forms of exploitation. 
The NCAA and professional sports leagues can both benefit 
by working together. A graduated salary cap based on college 
completion will help the professional sports leagues deal with 
the rising salaries of professional athletes, and also help colleg-
es keep their players in school longer and increase their reve-
nue. The revenue colleges receive will be less offensive if stu-
dent-athletes are better provided for. More importantly, stu-
dent-athlete will be encouraged to complete their college educa-
tions and earn degrees. This education will be further compen-
sation for the time student-athletes dedicate to their sport. 
Through endorsements and pay in the off season, student-
athletes will be further compensated in proportion to their 
talent. Universities will also be able to continue educating and 
providing school spirit through sports events without additional 
financial burdens. While schools do provide some student-ath-
letes with scholarships, this is not adequate compensation. 
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The NCAA needs to follow its own constitution and protect 
student-athletes "from exploitation by professional and com-
mercial enterprises"47 such as the NCAA and its member uni-
versities. The combination of payment and the salary cap will 
give strong incentives to student-athletes to stay in school and 
earn a degree. Not only will athletes be compensated through 
endorsements, but through education. A more proper emphasis 
will then be placed where it should be-on academic achieve-
ment. 
Steve Murphy & Jonathan Pace 
47. NCAA CONST. art. 2.6, supra note 10. 
